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Steele: Lemley v. Barr: Who Gets Baby Ryan and Who Should Decide

LEMLEY v. BARR: WHO GETS BABY RYAN AND WHO
SHOULD DECIDE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires
each state to give to the judgment of another state the same effect that the judgment would have in the state which rendered it.' The Ohio supreme court determined that an adoption procedure which allowed Ryan Barr to be removed
from his natural mother, Tammy Lemley, and placed in the hands of his adoptive
West Virginian parents, Gene and Anna Barr, was invalid. Subsequently, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Lemley v. Barr,2 was faced with the problem of deciding whether to give full faith and credit to the Ohio judgment and
to return Ryan to his natural mother, or to grant custody of the child to the
"adoptive" parents in disregard of the Ohio judgment.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the Ohio judgment
was entitled to full faith and credit. However, the court was not convinced that
it was in the best interests of Ryan Barr to have his custody changed at that
time. 4 Therefore, despite the determination that Tammy Lemley was entitled to
have the Ohio judgment upheld, the court declined to bestow upon her the physical
custody of her child in accordance with such judgment.
II.

STATIMENT OF THE CASE

Tammy L. Lemley and Bobby Lee Nash, Sr. gave birth to Bobby Lee Nash,
Jr. (now Ryan Barr) in Lawrence County, Ohio, the place of their residence, on
January 30, 1981.1 On May 5, 1981, while Tammy Lemley was still a minor, she
and Bobby Lee Nash, Sr. went to J. Stewart Kaiser and John E. Hall, attorneys
in Chesapeake, Ohio, in order to relinquish the child and execute the necessary
papers for adoption. Ms. Lemley became upset and refused to sign the papers.
However, the couple returned the next day, executed the adoption papers, and

' U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides: "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts
of such State, Territory or Possesion from which they are taken."
2 Lemley v. Barr, 343 S.E.2d 101 ff. Va. 1986).
1 Id. at 105.
4Id.

Id. at 102.
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left their child with Mr. Kaiser and Mr. Hall. 6 Later that day, Mr. Hall delivered
the child to Gene and Anna Barr of Huntington, West Virginia. On May 11,
1981, two days after Tammy Lemley reached the age of majority, Kaiser and
Hall informed her that she must meet with them again to re-execute the necessary
documents as an adult. 7 Later that day, Lemley's parents went to the law offices
of Kaiser and Hall to demand the return of the child on the basis that Tammy
was a minor at the time of the transaction. Mr. Kaiser told the Lemleys that it
was too late for him to do anything and that he would not assist them in obtaining
the return of their grandson. However, he failed to mention that the adoption
procedure was done in direct contravention of the existing Ohio law.'
A week later, Tammy Lemley and Bobby Lee Nash, Sr. returned to attorney
Kaiser's office to seek the return of their child. Once again, Kaiser refused to
assist them or reveal the identity of the couple to whom he had transferred the
child.9 In June, 1981, Lemley and her parents instituted a habeas corpus action 0
against Mr. Kaiser, Mr. Hall, and the unknown custodian of the child, in an
effort to secure the child's return. The habeas corpus petition was filed in the
Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Probate Juvenile Division."
On September 24, 1981, the juvenile court issued a writ of habeas corpus to
attorneys Kaiser and Hall ordering them to return the child to Tammy Lemley
2
or, in the alternative, to reveal the location of the child to the juvenile court.'
On August 13, 1982, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
juvenile court. 3

6

Id. at 103.

7 Id.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5103.16 (Anderson 1981) provides in pertinent part:
(A) Prior to the placement and receiving of the child, the parent or parents of the
child have personally applied to, and appeared before, the probate court of the county in
which the parent or parents reside, or in which the person seeking to adopt the child resides,
for approval of the proposed placement specified in the application and have signed and
filed with the court a written statement showing that the parent or parents are aware of
their right to contest the decree of adoption subject to the limitations of section 3107.16
of the Revised Code;
(B) The court, after an independent investigation of the proposed placement, conducted
as provided in section 3107.12 of the Revised Code, and after completion of the investigation
has determined that the proposed placement is in the best interests of the child;
(C) The court has approved of record the proposed placement.
9 Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 103.
10 Omo R v. CODE ANN. § 2725.01 (Anderson 1981) provides: "Whoever is unlawfully restrained
of his liberty, or entitled to the custody of another, of which custody such person is unlawfully
deprived, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment,
restraint, or deprivation."
" Oaio R~v. CODE ANmr.
§ 2725.02 (Anderson 1981) provides: "The Writ of Habeas Corpus
may be granted by the.. .probate court. ..
12 Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 103.
13

Id.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio, who on August 24, 1983, unanimously affirmed4
these lower court decisions, was extremely critical of the attorneys' behavior.'
The court stated that "because the provisions authorizing adoptions are purely
statutory, strict compliance with them is necessary," 5 and that the intent of the
legislature was to provide some measure of judicial control over adoption proceedings.'6 The court ordered Kaiser and Hall to reveal the names of the child's
custodians, because there was no legitimate reason for invoking the attorney-client
17
privilege in this case.
It is important to note that Tammy Lemley had no knowledge of her son's
whereabouts or of the Barr's identity until after the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling
on August 24, 1983. This case is further complicated by the fact that the Barrs
filed for adoption of the child in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West Virginia on November 6, 1981, despite their knowledge of the ongoing Ohio proceedings." The adoption was granted.
With the identity of the Barrs' disclosed, Lemley and her parents brought a
habeas corpus action in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West Virginia to
compel the Barrs to return the child in accordance with the Ohio judgment. The
lower court declined to give full faith and credit to the Ohio judgment and ruled
that the November 6, 1981, West Virginia adoption was proper.19 The Lemleys
appealed this ruling to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and asked
that the Ohio judgment be enforced. 20
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the Ohio judgment
must be enforced unless it could be proved that the Ohio court lacked juris-

Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St. 3d 258, 259, 452 N.E.2d 1304, 1306-07 (1983).
We are confronted with a factual milieu which forcefully suggests and overwhelmingly
implies that appellants [attorneys Kaiser and Hall] were active participants in the private,
independent, and surreptitious placement for adoption of the minor child without the slightest regard for and in complete contravention of the applicable statutory guidelines for such
independent placements. The record before us indicates that when testifying at the evidentiary hearing conducted by the juvenile court, appellants skillfully avoided admitting that
which seemingly may not be denied. The record, however, is abundantly clear that the
private, independent, and surreptitious placement of the minor child in the instant case was
only accomplished through a total derogation of the law. Id.
1 Id. at 260, 452 N.E.2d at 1307.
14

16 Id.
7 Id. at 265-66, 452 N.E.2d at 1311.
See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 59 Misc. 2d 149, 151,
298 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (1969). "No legitimate reason has been urged upon this court except the bare
claim of confidentiality of the clients' identity which would require this court to respect the claim
of confidentiality. On the contrary, the only purpose served by respecting this claim of confidentiality
would be to frustrate this court's legitimate processes and concern for the welfare of the child." Id.
Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 103.
Id. at 104.
20 Id.
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diction. 21 The Barrs asserted that the Ohio court lacked personal jurisdiction over

them because the Ohio judgment was obtained without service of process upon
them and without their appearance in the action. After considering the Ohio
statutes in which the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was
adopted, the court clearly felt that the state of Ohio had a significant connection
with the transaction. 22 After analyzing the UCCJA, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals decided that the Ohio court properly had jurisdiction over these
proceedings. The court, in its initial decision on November 13, 1985, ordered the
Circuit Court of Cabell County to grant full faith and credit to the Ohio judgment.
Furthermore, the court ordered that the child be returned to Tammy Lemley in
accordance with the Ohio decision.?
On December 12, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Barr petitioned the court for a rehearing. The court was advised that they had not heard arguments on, and had
not adequately considered the question of the best interests of the child. On
January 13, 1986, the court granted a rehearing. The court determined that the
Ohio judgment should be accorded full faith and credit in terms of setting aside
the formal West Virginia adoption, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court
of Cabell County for further proceedings to determine the best interests of the
child. 24

21 Id. at 105. "Full Faith and Credit must be given to the judgment or decree of a sister-state
if it is not successfully attacked on jurisdictional grounds." Id. (quoting State ex rel Lynn v. Eddy,
152 W. Va. 345, 163 S.E.2d 472 (1968) (Syl. pt. 2)).
Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 106.
(A) No court of this state having jurisdiction to determine the custody of a child shall
exercise that jurisdiction unless one of the following applies:
(1) This state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceedings, or this state had been the child's homestate within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from the state because of his removal
or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or a person
acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
(2) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assumes jurisdiction
because the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant
connection with this state, and there is availablein this state substantialevidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;

(C) Physical presence of the child while desirable, is not a pre-requisite for jurisdiction
to determine his custody. (Emphasis supplied by the court) Id. (quoting Oino REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.22) (Anderson Supp. 1980).
Lemley, 343 S.E. at 104. "Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cabell County
is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to the court to formulate an orderly transfer of
custody from the Barrs to the Lemleys." Id.
24Id. at 105.
[We conclude that Ms. Lemley is entitled to have our courts accord the Ohio judgment
full faith credit in terms of setting aside the formal West Virginia adoption. We are not
convinced, however, that it is in the best interests of Ryan Barr that his physical custody
be changed at this time and.. .we remand this case to the Circuit Court of Cabell County
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III.

PRuoR LAw

The United States Supreme Court has failed to remedy the jurisdictional problems that have arisen in child custody disputes, particularly in regard to the ap26
plication of full faith and credit principles in such cases.? In May v. Anderson,
the Court was faced with a problem of deciding whether an Ohio court was
obligated to give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree which awarded custody
of the children to their father. He had obtained such custody in an ex parte
divorce action in a Wisconsin court which had no personal jurisdiction over the
mother? The Court determined that Wisconsin's lack of personal jurisdiction
over the mother was a fatal defect which did 2not require the Ohio court to give
the Wisconsin judgment full faith and credit.
The plurality opinion in May has been widely criticized because the strict in
personam jurisdiction requirements seem to encourage parental abduction. 29 The
concurring opinion, written by Justice Frankfurter, sets forth the standard by
which May has been interpreted. 0 Frankfurter felt that May allowed states to
honor foreign custody decrees without personal jurisdiction over an absent parent
but it did not require them to do so under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
What is decided-the only thing the Court decides-is that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require Ohio, in disposing of the custody of children in
Ohio, to accept, in the circumstances before us, the disposition made by Wisconsin. The Ohio Supreme Court felt itself so bound. This Court does not decide
that Ohio would be precluded from recognizing, as a matter of local law, the
respect to the Wisdisposition made by the Wisconsin court. For Ohio to give
3
consin decree would not offend the Due Process Clause. '
West Virginia case law is also replete with examples of the confusion created by
forum shopping in child custody litigation. The leading cases reveal unique fact
situations in which parents move from one jurisdiction to another in search of
32
a sympathetic court.

for further proceedings to determine the best interests of this child.
Id.

See generally New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604 (1958); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
2 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
27Id. at 528-29.
2 Id. at 533-35.
2 H. CLAIRE, Tm LAW OF Do snc RELT.IONS m Tm UNITED STATES 326 (1968).
30 McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611, 616 (f. Va. 1984).
31May, 345 U.S. at 535-36, (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32 See Suter v. Suter, 128 W. Va. 511, 37 S.E.2d 474 (1946); Cantrell v. Cantrell, 143 W. Va.
826, 106 S.E.2d 768 (1958); State ex rel. Ravitz v. Fox, 273 S.E.2d 370 (V. Va. 1980); Stewart v.
Stewart, 289 S.E.2d 652 (f. Va. 1980).
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However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took a giant step
forward in the case of Shermer v. Cornelius. 3 Judy Cornelius was awarded
custody of her two children by the Supreme Court of Yates County, New York,
in a divorce proceeding against her husband, David Shermer. Shermer was granted
34
visitation rights.
No difficulties arose until Mr. Shermer disappeared for almost a four year
period without paying child support. During this period, the children still continued to visit their paternal grandparents. During one such visit in the summer
35
of 1980, the children were abducted by the father.
After a five month search for her children, Ms. Cornelius discovered their
whereabouts in southern West Virginia. However, Mr. Shermer denied her access
to the children.3 6 At this point, Shermer and his present wife, Peggy, filed a
petition in Mingo County Circuit Court praying for custody of the children. Ms.
Cornelius subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the West
Virginia court did not have jurisdiction. The lower court refused to recognize the
exclusive jurisdiction of the New York court. Further proceedings were stayed
while the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered the certified question of whether full faith and credit should be extended to the New York custody
37
order.

The court held that the New York decision would be constitutionally protected
and given the same force and effect in West Virginia as it had in New York.3"
Thus, the court judicially adopted the principles of the UCCJA. 9 The court's
decision was entered on May 14, 1981, shortly before the UCCJA was to come
into effect in West Virginia.
The West Virginia legislature passed the UCCJA on March 31, 1981, and
the act became effective on June 29, 1981 .40 The purposes of the UCCJA are
expressed in section 48-10-1 of the West Virginia Code:
(1) To avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states
in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of
children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;

11Shermer v. Cornelius, 278 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1981).
Id. at 349-50.
11Id. at 350.
36

Id.

37 Id.

11Id. at 351.
39 Id.

at 351-52.
The UCCJA became effective in Ohio on October 25, 1977. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.213109.27. For purposes of determining the jurisdiction of the Ohio court, the law of Ohio applies.
Therefore, any questions regarding the retroactive application of West Virgina law are obviated. Both
states have adopted the UCCJA in almost identifical form. Therefore, in order to aid the West Virginia
practitioner, reference will generally be made to the W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-1 to -26 (1981).
40
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(2) To promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a
custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the
interest of the child;
(3) To assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection
and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this State decline
the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection
with another state;
(4) To discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;
(5) To deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to
obtain custody awards;
(6) To avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this State insofar
as feasible;
(7) To facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) To promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of
mutual assistance between the courts of this State and those of other states concerning the same child; and
4
(9) To make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 1

However, the UCCJA's primary significance is that it establishes the binding
nature of a custody decree which has been entered in a manner consistent with
the jurisdictional and notice requirements of the act. It is no longer possible to
argue that courts are competent to modify custody decrees on the grounds that
such decrees are not res judicata and therefore not entitled to full faith and credit
42
protection.
A foreign state may modify a custody decree of a sister state only if it is
shown that the court of original jurisdiction can no longer maintain its authority,
and the foreign state can lawfully establish jurisdiction under the act. 43 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws discussed a hypothetical situation in their Notes to the Act which offers insight as to when a court
of original jurisdiction would be forced to surrender jurisdiction to a foreign state:
For example, if custody was awarded to the father in state I where he continued
to live with the children for two years and thereafter his wife kept the children

§ 48-10-1 (1986).
§§ 48-10-3, -4, -5, -13, -14 (1986); Moran, Uniform Child Custody Act, 84
W. Va. L. Rev. 135, 153-54 (1981).
" W. VA. CODE § 48-10-15 (a) (1986).
41

W.

VA. CODE

42

W.

VA. CODE
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in state 2 for 6 1/2 months (3 1/2 months beyond her visitation privileges) with
or without the permission of the husband, state 1 has preferred jurisdiction to
modify the decree despite the fact that state 2 has, in the meantime, become the
'home state' of the child. If, however, the father also moved away from state
1, that state loses modification jurisdiction interstate, whether or not its jurisdiction continues under local law .... [A]Iso, if the father in the same case continued to live in state 1, but let his wife keep the children for several years without
asserting his custody rights and without visits of the children in state 1, modi-

fication jurisdiction of state 1 would cease."
While the UCCJA supports the continuing jurisdiction of the original court that
rendered a child custody order and provides optimism that child custody disputes
will be resolved in a more consistent manner, the Act does not provide a comprehensive solution to the problems which arise in such cases. 4 Therefore, Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) in 1980,46 in order
that interstate controversies and conflicts regarding enforcement of custody and
visitation orders be discouraged and interstate abductions of children be deterred. 47
The PKPA is substantially similar to the UCCJA and strongly advocates the
theory of continuing jurisdiction in custody disputes. The jurisdiction of a court
of a state which has made a child custody determination in a manner consistent
with the provisions of the PKPA continues as long as such court has jurisdiction
under the law of such state and such state remains the residence of the child or
of any contestant."
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the impact of the
PKPA when it noted in Arbogast v. Arbogast49 that "[o]ne of the primary distinctions between the PKPA and the UCCJA is that the federal act seems to more
clearly prefer continuing jurisdiction in the state that issued a valid initial decree." 50 Therefore, it appears that the PKPA "provides the 'teeth' which should
make it possible to test the effectiveness of the jurisdictional network created by
the UCCJA."' '5
Because the UCCJA and the PKPA require the forum state (West Virginia
in this case), to give full faith and credit to a valid custody order which has been

" Moran, supra note 42, at 154, (quoting

UNa'. CHMiD JURISDICTION ACT § 14 (Commissioners'

note)).

41 Abram, The ParentalKidnappingPrevention Act: Constitutionalityand Effectiveness, 33 CAsO
W. RES. 89, 94 (1982).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
4 H.R. REP. NO. 1401, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980); Abram, supra note 45, at 96.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (d).
49 Arbogast v. Arbogast, 327 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1984).
10ld. at 679.
51Moran, supra note 42, at 156.
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issued by the rendering state (Ohio in this case), this necessarily
means that such
52
judgment shall be given full effect in the forum state.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that "the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution requires that the judgment of a State court
which had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in suit, shall be given
in the courts of every other State the same credit, validity, and effect which it
'53
has in the State where it was rendered, and be equally conclusive upon the merits.
"Furthermore, if the judgment was valid where rendered, it must be enforced in
such other state, although repugnant to its own statutes. ' 54 "It is the judgment
that must be given full faith and credit. In neither case can its integrity be
im''
paired, save for attacks on the jurisdiction of the court that rendered it. 15
While these United States Supreme Court decisions were rendered prior to
the adoption of the UCCJA and the PKPA, it is clear that if the application of
full faith and credit principles to a foreign custody decree is warranted, then such
decree must also be accorded the same effect that it has in the state where it was
pronounced.
In Lemley, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals felt compelled to
determine the best interests of the child.5 6 Prior law on the subject is limited in
that there is no authority which addresses the question of whether a state may
consider the best interests of the child at the expense of applying full faith and
credit principles.
However, in Bennett v. Jeffreys,5 7 the New York Court of Appeals said:
The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the right of a parent
to the custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are
present, would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interests of the child,
on the theory solely of an absolute legal right. 8

Nonetheless, the court felt that unlawful conduct should be deterred.
The resolution of cases must not provide incentives for those likely to take the
law into their own hands. Thus, those who obtain custody of children unlawfully,
particularly by kidnapping, violence, or flight from the jurisdiction of the courts,

52 "By virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the constitution of the United States, a
judgment of a court of another state has the same force and effect in this state as it has in the state
in which it was pronounced." State ex rel. Lynn v. Eddy, 152 W. Va. 345, 163 S.E.2d 472 (1968),
(Syl. pt. 3).
1 Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 451-52 (1928).
54

Id.

Union National Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 42 reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 928 (1949).
' Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 109-10.
s7Bennett v. Jeffreys, 49 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
11Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25.
"s
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must be deterred. Society may not reward, except at its peril, the lawless because
the passage of time has made correction inexpedient. Yet, even then, circumstances
may require that, in the best interest of the child, the unlawful acts be blinkedA9
This logic suggests that the acts which facilitate a custody dispute may be regarded
as irrelevant in determining the ultimate issue in such a dispute, i.e. who gets the
child.
West Virginia has followed the rule in disputed custody cases that the welfare
of the child is of utmost importance.6 However, in Ford v. Ford,61 the court
held that a natural mother who left her child with its grandparents on a temporary
basis was an "unoffending parent," not having led the grandparents to believe
that the custody arrangement was a permanent one. By returning the infant to
the natural mother, the court expressed its sentiments that the mother had a right
to the child notwithstanding the fact that the child's best interests may have been
served by staying with the grandparents. 62
Evidently, disputes involving the "best interests" of the child will have to be
decided on a case by case basis, and the court will be allowed wide discretion in
making its determinations.
IV.

ANALYsis

Once the Ohio supreme court determined that the "adoption procedure" was
in direct contravention of Ohio law, it was clear that Tammy Lemley was the
only person who had a legal right to the child. She simply sought to enforce that
right in West Virginia. Presumably, the courts of West Virginia have a duty to
deliver the child to Lemley in accordance with her rights. There are seemingly
two ways in which the West Virginia courts can avoid enforcement of the Ohio
judgement.
First, if a finding can be made that the Ohio court lacked jurisdiction, then
the judgment rendered in Ohio is not entitled to full faith and credit protection. 63
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals analyzed the Ohio court's jurisdiction in terms of the UCCJA.64 Clearly the Ohio court neither contemplated
the dispute that has evolved nor did it not refer directly to the UCCJA in its
decision of the original case. It is obvious, however, that the West Virginia court
was asked to decide a custody battle and that the principles which are enunciated
in the UCCJA and the PKPA should be followed.

19Id. at 550, 356 N.E.2d at 284, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
60 See West Virginia Dept. of Human Services v. La Rea Ann C. L., 332 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va.
1985); State ex rel. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W. Va. 419, 108 S.E.2d 521 (1959).
11Ford v. Ford, 303 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 255.

Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 105.
Id. at 106.
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The West Virginia court had no problem finding that the Ohio court properly
had jurisdiction over the proceedings because Ohio had been Ryan's home state
within six months prior to the habeas corpus action which was initiated in the
Ohio Court of Common Pleas.65 Tammy Lemley was not only a resident of Ohio
at the time the action was commenced, but also substantial evidence concerning
Ryan's care, training, and personal relationships was available in Ohio.6 6 Furthermore, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas is a court of general jurisdiction
with the authority to determine its own jurisdiction over both the person and the
subject matter. Therefore, there is a presumption that if a court of general jurisdiction determines that it has jurisdiction over a particular case, then such
determination is conclusive 7 Additionally, the Barrs have the burden of over68
coming this presumption.
The Barrs claimed that the Ohio court did not obtain personal jurisdiction
over them because they were never served with process and never appeared in
the action.6 9 This argument is tenuous at best because the Barrs had to know of
the suit or they would not have instructed Kaiser and Hall to assert the attorneyclient privilege on their behalf. Therefore, the Barrs had the actual notice that
service of process is designed to provide.70 Furthermore, Kaiser and Hall were
served with process in this action and, because of their obvious relationship with
the Barrs, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals felt that this may have
been enough to give the Barrs "constructive" notice of the action. 71
Any question of jurisdiction is obviated however, under the UCCJA if a party
submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 2 The West Virginia court felt that by
trying to invoke the attorney-client privilege, the Barrs had, in essence, raised a
defense.73 The court felt that the Barrs could have challenged the Ohio court's
jurisdiction. However, the Barrs chose to fight the suit on the basis of the attorney-client privilege, and having lost, they are precluded from raising the ju74
risdictional issue.
It is clearly impossible for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to
deny that the Ohio court rightfully had jurisdiction to determine this matter.
Therefore, according to the provisions of the UCCJA and the PKPA,7 5 and ac-

0

See supra note 22; W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-3(a)(1)(ii).
6 See supra note 22; W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-3(a)(1)(ii),-(a)(3).
Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 105-06; Fortner v. Fortner, 282 S.E.2d 48, 50 (W. Va. 1981).
Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 105.
61Id. at 106.
10Id. at 107.
7, Id. at 107; Spaulding v. Spaulding, 460 A.2d 1360 (Me. 1983).
7 W. VA. CODE § 48-10-5(d).
73 Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 108.
74Id.
", W. VA. CODE

§ 48-10-14; 28 U.S.C. 1738A(a).
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cording to the full faith and credit principles that have been enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court, it would seem that the West Virginia court has a
duty to return the child to Tammy Lemley in order to honor the Ohio court's
determination of this matter and in order to be consistent with Lemley's legal
rights.
However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that the Ohio
decision would be accorded full faith and credit only in terms of setting aside
the formal West Virginia adoption. 76 This language is inconsistent with the application of full faith and credit principles. In order for the court to give the
Ohio judgment full faith and credit, the court must do what the Ohio court would
have done. While invalidation of the West Virginia adoption proceedings would
be a direct result of the enforcement of the Ohio judgment, it should not be the
only result. Furthermore, the attempted adoption proceeding in West Virginia was
contrary to the purposes of the UCCJA. 77 This proceeding also violated Title 28,
section 1738A(g) of the United States Code which states that a court of a state
"shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceedings for a custody determination
commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another state where
such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the pro' 78
visions of this section to make a custody determination.
Additionally, under the UCCJA, there is a requirement to inform the court
of any custody proceedings that are ongoing in other states.7 9 In view of these
factors, the attempted adoption proceeding in West Virginia seems invalid on its
face, regardless of whether full faith and credit principles are applied. It is unnecessary for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to discuss this attempted adoption in its full faith and credit analysis.
Because the jurisdiction of the Ohio court is clear, the West Virginia court
has a duty to return Ryan to Tammy Lemley. To do otherwise would be to
disregard the full faith and credit that the Ohio judgment deserves. Therefore,
the court, in its original decision on November 13, 1985, ordered that Ryan be
transferred from the Barrs to the Lemleys.80
However, even though the Ohio court was not susceptible to jurisdictional
attack, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals felt that the judgment was
in need of modification. Other than a jurisdictional attack, the only way that
the Barrs can hope to retain Ryan is if the West Virginia court can lawfully assert
jurisdiction and if the court decides that it is in the best interest of Ryan to
remain with the Barrs.

16 Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 105.
' W. VA. CODE § 48-10-1 (1986).
79 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (g).
7W.
VA. CODE § 48-10-9 (1986).
10Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 104.
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For purposes of analysis, it is logical to interpret the Barrs' petition for a
rehearing as a request to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to modify
the Ohio court's custody determination. 8 1 While West Virginia is Ryan's "home
state" and much evidence concerning Ryan's welfare is present in this state, the
main question to be answered is whether Ohio can no longer maintain jurisdiction
over this custody dispute. While the UCCJA provides for some flexibility in determining modification jurisdiction,8 it seems that a strong argument could be
made that because Ohio had original jurisdiction, and still has a significant con83
nection with this dispute, jurisdiction over this matter should remain in Ohio.
Furthermore, under the PKPA, the jurisdiction of a state court which makes a
valid custody determination continues as long as such court has jurisdiction under
the law of such state, and that state remains the residence of the child or of any
contestant.8 4 Clearly, the Ohio courts would have jurisdiction under the law of
Ohio.8" Additionally, Tammy Lemley, a contestant, remained a resident of Ohio.
Therefore, it is only appropriate in terms of fairness and in terms of the purposes
of the UCCJA and the PKPA that Ohio maintain jurisdiction over this matter.
While the Barrs cannot be characterized as kidnappers, 8 6 their legal right to
Ryan does not appear to be any greater than that of a kidnapper. The only legal
argument that they can assert (assuming arguendo that West Virginia has jurisdiction to modify the Ohio decision), is that it would be in Ryan's best interest
to remain with them. While the Barrs assert that they are concerned with Ryan's
best interests, it is abundantly clear that they are primarily concerned with their
own best interests.
The Barrs must have been aware shortly after their acquisition of Ryan that
Tammy Lemley sought the return of the child. After all, Lemley filed a habeas
corpus proceeding the following month after Ryan had been transferred to them.
Rather than appear at this proceeding, the Barrs sought to invoke the attorneyclient privilege, thereby denying Lemley a chance to learn of her son's whereabouts. Furthermore, when faced with an adverse decision in the lower court of
Ohio, the Barrs chose to appeal. While the Barrs did not do anything illegal,
they have clearly chosen to prolong the situation in such a manner that Ryan
will surely be harmed regardless of the end result. The Barrs, knowing that they
had a legally weak position, sought to win by hiding their identity. Their appeals
to the higher courts of Ohio were, in essence, delay tactics. Furthermore, they
initiated an adoption proceeding in West Virginia in order to gain the benefit of
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a favorable jurisdiction. While these strategies are not considered unlawful, they
certainly were not conducive to Ryan's best interests. Finally, the best interest
argument that the Barrs ultimately asserted was the only good point that could
be made to protect their interest, but not necessarily Ryan's.
This is not to say that the best interest argument is unimportant. It is difficult
to believe that such an argument can be considered in a vacuum, insulated from
the circumstances and the legal rights that are necessarily a part of every child
custody dispute. Ryan's best interests should be considered in the final determination as to his custody. However, the proper forum for such consideration
appears to be Ohio.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
asked to resolve a sensitive issue. Nonetheless, the court's decision does not comport with the purpose of the UCCJA and the PKPA. While the state certainly
has a concern for the interest of its citizens, it must also have respect for the
judgment of its sister state.
The court's decision seems to encourage the kind of forum shopping that the
UCCJA and the PKPA were enacted to prevent. Clearly, the court had a duty
to return the child to Tammy Lemley in accordance with the Ohio judgment and
Full Faith and Credit principles. Not only did the court fail to carry out this
duty, but it also presumed that it was the appropriate forum for determining the
child's best interests, despite the fact that the UCCJA and the PKPA favor continuing jurisdiction and consistency in custody disputes.
There is no doubt that Ryan's best interests warrant consideration in this
case. In any event, the West Virginia court can be assured that Ohio is also equally
concerned with Ryan's interests. Therefore, in accordance with the principles that
have been laid out in the UCCJA and the PKPA, any modification as to Ryan's
custody should be made by the Ohio courts.
While it is important to sympathize with Ryan Barr's best interests in this
case, it is also important to discourage the kind of forum shopping and child
abduction that was prevalent in the days before the enactment of the UCCJA
and the PKPA.
Thomas Steele
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